Security of Virtual Switch Fabrics
There have been two excellent analyst reports that have come out over the past few months that cover security concerns that arise from implementing virtualization in the data center; one from Burton and one from Yankee. This is in contrast to the numerous reports and articles that are available about how to secure your VDI, which is something completely different, and even one or two that suggest virtualization security isn’t an issue (Mr. Monthly Naysaying Nancy IT magazine editor, you know I’m talking about your OpEd piece mid-late 2007). Although they aren’t free, I highly recommend both reports as starting points for thinking about how implementing virtualization in your enterprise DC doesn’t come without concerns and risks, and probably introduces new ones you haven’t (yet) considered.
Both reports, however, tend to gloss over the security risks of implementing a software switching fabric, and pushing all your virtual application data through that switch fabric. I think this is an interesting omission, given that there is so much security built around physical networks in the DC. There’s a ton of research going on right now wrt poking through or infecting the hypervisor, and VDI patch management. But why is there less public research and data available for virtual networking security than there is with hypervisor security? Just on a code level, the network drivers used in some VDIs are open-source; the hypervisor code isn’t.
So why the lack of focus and research? I don’t have an answer.

